Middle East Conflict Disruption Updates & Situation Report – March 4, 2026 

March 4, 2026 | 8:30 AM EST

Conflict in the Middle East has triggered immediate disruptions across global supply chains. This summary outlines the operational, economic, and cold chain impacts by region, highlighting both short-term bottlenecks and potential longer-term consequences for temperature-sensitive goods. 

Immediate and Medium-Term Supply Chain Disruption – Maritime 

Major international shipping line MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company has declared an “End of Voyage” for all containerized cargo destined for ports inside the Arabian Gulf (i.e., beyond the Strait of Hormuz).  This is a rare and highly consequential step. In practice, it means: 

• Cargo originally destined for ports such as Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Dammam, Doha, and Kuwait will not be delivered there by MSC vessels. 

• Instead, containers will be discharged at the next “safe” port outside the Gulf—for example ports such as Salalah, Jeddah, or another regional hub depending on the vessel’s routing. 

• MSC will apply a surcharge of USD 800 per container to cover deviation costs. 

• MSC considers its contract of carriage fulfilled once the cargo is discharged at the diversion port. From that point onward, the cargo owner is responsible for arranging onward transportation or rebooking the shipment. 

In effect, MSC has taken a formal legal step to limit its exposure, shifting much of the operational risk and cost of the disruption onto cargo owners. 

Status of Other Major Shipping Lines 

As of 8:00 AM March 4th, other carriers have not taken the same contractual step, but they are implementing significant operational restrictions. 

• Maersk – Has suspended vessel transits through the Strait of Hormuz. Ships and services are being paused or rerouted, with delays expected. However, Maersk has not formally terminated contracts mid-voyage in the same way as MSC. 

• Hapag-Lloyd – Has suspended all transits through the Strait of Hormuz until further notice and warned customers of rerouting, delays, and possible war-risk surcharges. 

• CMA CGM – Has instructed vessels in the Gulf to move to shelter areas and implemented emergency measures, including suspending certain bookings and cargo types. 

• Ocean Network Express (ONE) – Has temporarily suspended new bookings to and from the Persian Gulf. 

• COSCO Shipping – Has halted container ship transits through the Strait of Hormuz 

Insurance and Risk Environment 

These operational decisions largely reflect actions taken by the marine insurance market and protection and indemnity (P&I) clubs. 

• Major P&I clubs — including Gard, Skuld, NorthStandard, London P&I Club, and American Club — have announced the termination of war-risk cover for ships operating in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, effective around 5 March 2026. 

• The Joint War Committee (JWC), which defines marine insurance risk areas for the Lloyd’s market, has expanded the list of designated high-risk zones. The revised risk area now includes waters around Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and parts of the Arabian Gulf and approaches to the Strait of Hormuz. 

System-Level Effects 

Unlike the discrete disruption caused by the Suez Canal blockage, this crisis is expected to produce multiple cascading impacts across the global shipping network. 

Stranded Vessels 

• Roughly 10% of the global container fleet was reported to be caught in the regional disruption during the early stages of the crisis. 
• Hundreds of vessels across container, tanker, and bulk sectors are currently delayed, diverted, or waiting outside the Gulf. 
• The End-of-Voyage declaration will lead to mid-voyage diversions and unscheduled port calls, creating knock-on disruption across global port rotations and container flows. 

Equipment Imbalance 

• The primary cold-chain concern beyond immediate trade disruption is container equipment imbalance. 
• The Gulf is a major import destination for refrigerated cargo. 
• Large volumes of empty reefer containers may become stranded in Gulf markets. 
• This will likely create shortages of reefer equipment in Asian export hubs and temporary surpluses in diversion and transshipment ports.

Disruption Projections 

First-Order Impacts (1–2 weeks) 

• Port of Salalah in Oman is emerging as the primary fallback transshipment hub. It sits outside the Strait of Hormuz while remaining close to Gulf markets. The port already functions as a major east–west transshipment hub on Asia–Europe routes. 
• Cargo originally destined for Gulf ports is increasingly being rerouted via Salalah and other Omani ports. 
• If diversion volumes increase significantly, analysts expect Terminal and yard congestion, shortages of feeder vessels into Gulf markets and rising container dwell times.
• Secondary fallback ports include Port of Sohar (Oman), Port of Duqm (Oman) and Khor Fakkan Container Terminal (UAE). These ports may function as relay points for feeder services into the Gulf once shipping resumes, but they are not designed to absorb the scale of diversion volumes currently expected. Regional disruption is already emerging and will likely intensify during the second week of the conflict. 

Second-Order Impacts (2–4 weeks) 

• Major Asian transshipment hubs are expected to begin feeling ‘secondary shock.’
• Likely pressure points include Port of Singapore, Port of Tanjung Pelepas (Malaysia), Port Klang (Malaysia) and Port of Colombo (Sri Lanka) 
• Congestion and network disruption at these hubs could become visible within three to four weeks. 

Medium-Term Impacts (One Month and Beyond) 

If the disruption continues into a second month: 

• More shipping capacity will likely be diverted via the Cape of Good Hope route around Africa for Asia–Europe trade. 
• This will place additional pressure on major Mediterranean transshipment hubs, including Port of Piraeus (Greece), Port of Gioia Tauro (Italy), Port of Valencia (Spain), Port of Algeciras (Spain) Marsaxlokk Harbour (Malta) 
• African ports receive most imports from China, India and South East Asia, they will feel the impacts of pressure in the major Asian hubs relatively quickly. Perhaps the biggest risk to Africa however is the immediate impact of increased freight rates as the system adjusts to reduced and disrupted capacity overall.  
• The final regions to feel the effects are likely to be the United States and South America, where impacts from equipment imbalance and trade diversion could become visible after four to six weeks.